PACC Inquiry - Supplementary Submission -Public Inquiry
Supplementary
Response to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Inquiry into the Response to Covid-19 and the Coronavirus Act 2020.
Name: Philip
Trendall
Contact: XXXXXXXXXXX
Date: XXXXXXXXXXX
Type of
Response: Individual
Word Count: 937
INTRODUCTION
On 25th
June 2020 I submitted a memorandum to the committee on this subject. This was before the committee’s terms of
reference were updated to include the prospect of a public inquiry. Therefore I submit this supplementary note
for the information of the committee and would respectfully ask that it is read
in conjunction with my memorandum dated 25th June 2020.
For convenience
I have followed the order of issues used in the Call for Evidence.
A PUBLIC
INQUIRY?
1.
I
would suggest that two inquiries are required.
The first should be an inquiry set up under the Inquiries Act 2005
(Inquiry 1). This inquiry should cover
how well the UK was prepared for the pandemic and how well it has responded. This
should include the response of central government. The second inquiry (Inquiry 2)
could also be an inquiry under the Act or could be a non-statutory inquiry that
should be set up to consider the arrangements and frameworks for emergency preparedness
in the UK. If a non statutory inquiry is
selected then I would suggest that Lord Justice Clarke’s Inquiry into the identification
of victims after major transport accidents would provide a model.
2.
This
is always an issue with inquiries but the obvious urgency of the questions for
an inquiry helps to dictate the balance.
I would suggest that Inquiry 1 should be required to report within two years
with the requirement to produce interim reports when the chair believes these
to be useful. Inquiry 2 should complete
its report within 2 years but should report sooner if possible. The chairs of
both inquiries will need to maintain a close liaison to ensure that the reports
complement each other. Some of the
evidence taken for Inquiry 1 will be relevant to the deliberations of Inquiry
2.
3.
I
do not agree that there is a distinction between the two. Inquiries under the 2005 Act may not determine
liability, but nor should they shy away from highlighting failings. Generally the inquiry should be about
understanding what worked and what didn’t.
Its overall aim should be to ensure that the country is better able to
respond to large scale disasters (including but not exclusively health
disasters) in the future. There is no value
in conducting a witch hunt. An open
acknowledgement that many people have been making very difficult decisions in
extraordinary circumstances is a starting point. Decisions that have turned out to be wrong
are still reasonable if they were made in a competent manner, taking into account
all the information available to the decision maker. In cases where decisions were taken without
regard to the evidence, or for political or presentational reasons there should
be no hesitation in exposing this as inappropriate.
4.
Both
suggested inquiries should be UK wide.
Inquiry 1 should be established with s27 of the 2005 Act in mind. This will require close co-operation with the
devolved administrations. This
co-operation should not be a reason for delay.
Inquiry 2 could be established on the same basis, or at least should
cover England and Wales. There is no
value in having separate inquiries for Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland and
England.
5.
The
chair of Inquiry 1 should be a serving or retired senior judge. The ability to manage large amounts of
evidence and to distil the same into workable recommendations requires the sort
of experience that only judges have.
Given my answer to (4) above it would make sense if the judge were to
have experience in a country other than England. The chair of Inquiry 2 should be a leading
academic with experience in the management of emergency planning and
government. This is a very small field
and therefore if this were not possible then other options would be a judge or
a leading public figure with relevant experience, possible a peer.
6.
The
breadth of the issues under consideration, not least the scientific issues,
suggests that a panel is required. One
or more panel members should have a health and science background. There should be members who have experience
of the devolved administrations and at least one member with knowledge and
experience of emergency management, civil protection and emergency
planning. Given the nature of the
inquiry full use should be made of Assessors appointed under section 11.
7.
The
terms of reference are a matter for the minister. However a short public consultation and a
debate in Parliament would help inform the Minister’s decision. It is vital that the terms of reference are
not used to overly restrict the inquiry.
If the terms of reference appear to have been drawn in a manner that is
favourable to the government the purpose behind an inquiry will have been
defeated and its recommendations will not enjoy the confidence of the general
public.
8.
Parliament
does not have a direct role if an inquiry is established under the 2005 Act, although
Members of Parliament could provide evidence.
An early agreement from the government for a full debate on the report
of the inquiry (including any interim reports) would be useful. The results of Inquiry 2 are likely to
require primary legislation and would therefore engage both Houses in the
normal way.
9.
There
are none but the vigilance of the committee, other committees and members will
be essential.
I would be
pleased to clarify or expand any of the above points.
Philip Trendall
QPM
July 2020
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