PACC Inquiry - Supplementary Submission -Public Inquiry


Supplementary Response to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee Inquiry into the Response to Covid-19 and the Coronavirus Act 2020.

Name:                         Philip Trendall
Contact:                      XXXXXXXXXXX
Date:                           XXXXXXXXXXX
Type of Response:      Individual
Word Count:                937     


INTRODUCTION
On 25th June 2020 I submitted a memorandum to the committee on this subject.  This was before the committee’s terms of reference were updated to include the prospect of a public inquiry.  Therefore I submit this supplementary note for the information of the committee and would respectfully ask that it is read in conjunction with my memorandum dated 25th June 2020.
For convenience I have followed the order of issues used in the Call for Evidence.

A PUBLIC INQUIRY?
1.    I would suggest that two inquiries are required.  The first should be an inquiry set up under the Inquiries Act 2005 (Inquiry 1).  This inquiry should cover how well the UK was prepared for the pandemic and how well it has responded. This should include the response of central government. The second inquiry (Inquiry 2) could also be an inquiry under the Act or could be a non-statutory inquiry that should be set up to consider the arrangements and frameworks for emergency preparedness in the UK.  If a non statutory inquiry is selected then I would suggest that Lord Justice Clarke’s Inquiry into the identification of victims after major transport accidents would provide a model.
2.    This is always an issue with inquiries but the obvious urgency of the questions for an inquiry helps to dictate the balance.  I would suggest that Inquiry 1 should be required to report within two years with the requirement to produce interim reports when the chair believes these to be useful.  Inquiry 2 should complete its report within 2 years but should report sooner if possible. The chairs of both inquiries will need to maintain a close liaison to ensure that the reports complement each other.  Some of the evidence taken for Inquiry 1 will be relevant to the deliberations of Inquiry 2.
3.    I do not agree that there is a distinction between the two.  Inquiries under the 2005 Act may not determine liability, but nor should they shy away from highlighting failings.  Generally the inquiry should be about understanding what worked and what didn’t.  Its overall aim should be to ensure that the country is better able to respond to large scale disasters (including but not exclusively health disasters) in the future.  There is no value in conducting a witch hunt.  An open acknowledgement that many people have been making very difficult decisions in extraordinary circumstances is a starting point.  Decisions that have turned out to be wrong are still reasonable if they were made in a competent manner, taking into account all the information available to the decision maker.  In cases where decisions were taken without regard to the evidence, or for political or presentational reasons there should be no hesitation in exposing this as inappropriate.
4.    Both suggested inquiries should be UK wide.  Inquiry 1 should be established with s27 of the 2005 Act in mind.  This will require close co-operation with the devolved administrations.  This co-operation should not be a reason for delay.  Inquiry 2 could be established on the same basis, or at least should cover England and Wales.  There is no value in having separate inquiries for Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland and England. 
5.    The chair of Inquiry 1 should be a serving or retired senior judge.  The ability to manage large amounts of evidence and to distil the same into workable recommendations requires the sort of experience that only judges have.  Given my answer to (4) above it would make sense if the judge were to have experience in a country other than England.  The chair of Inquiry 2 should be a leading academic with experience in the management of emergency planning and government.  This is a very small field and therefore if this were not possible then other options would be a judge or a leading public figure with relevant experience, possible a peer.
6.    The breadth of the issues under consideration, not least the scientific issues, suggests that a panel is required.  One or more panel members should have a health and science background.  There should be members who have experience of the devolved administrations and at least one member with knowledge and experience of emergency management, civil protection and emergency planning.  Given the nature of the inquiry full use should be made of Assessors appointed under section 11. 
7.    The terms of reference are a matter for the minister.  However a short public consultation and a debate in Parliament would help inform the Minister’s decision.  It is vital that the terms of reference are not used to overly restrict the inquiry.  If the terms of reference appear to have been drawn in a manner that is favourable to the government the purpose behind an inquiry will have been defeated and its recommendations will not enjoy the confidence of the general public.
8.    Parliament does not have a direct role if an inquiry is established under the 2005 Act, although Members of Parliament could provide evidence.  An early agreement from the government for a full debate on the report of the inquiry (including any interim reports) would be useful.  The results of Inquiry 2 are likely to require primary legislation and would therefore engage both Houses in the normal way.
9.    There are none but the vigilance of the committee, other committees and members will be essential.
I would be pleased to clarify or expand any of the above points.

Philip Trendall QPM
July 2020

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