A Long Reply to a Short Post on Linkedin: JESIP

 

This isn’t an article, it isn’t really a blog (although I will post it as such elsewhere).  It is really a comment on a recent helpful post on Linkedin by Rob Davis on the subject of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP).  Alas my comment is too long winded for the normal format.

Before saying anything else I would mention that some posters have suggested that Mr Davis has pre-empted his own research findings.  This doesn’t worry me – some things are obvious even early on in research and any final conclusions that the author reaches will be subject to the rigours of the academic system that surrounds such high awards.  The fact that JESIP doesn’t always work is a well documented fact.

JESIP is a simple, indeed a worthy, statement of good intent.  The principles are, in one sense, not capable of being doubted.  Perhaps this is the reason that criticism is sometimes treated as heresy.  As a member of the public my expectation that responding agencies will work smoothly together in the communal interest is deeply felt.  It is rather more than an expectation, it is an assumption.  There are plenty of examples of super inter agency working and so, in my lay naivety, I struggle to understand why this cannot always be the case.   The task therefore is to understand why the application of something so fundamental cannot be guaranteed. 

Has JESIP improved multi agency working at major incidents?  I suspect that it has made some contribution but I am not sure how one can measure this.  Before JESIP there are plenty of examples of first class responder co-operation (The Clapham Rail accident as described in the subsequent Inquiry report being one). 

JESIP came about as a result of the Rule 43 Report arising from the inquests into those murdered in the July 2005 terrorist attacks.  It was, and in some areas still is, focused on the emergency services and this in itself is a problem.  The inquests that led to the report heard plenty of evidence of good co-operation between responders in what was a hugely complex event and this reminds us of the need to avoid binary arguments when analysing events that have a long lasting influence.

The title of the ‘principles’ has, as its starting point, the emergency services.  There is a hierarchy of responders and this is understandable on one level.  But this hierarchy pervades more than just the initial response.  It influences the culture of emergency management throughout its life cycle.  If JESIP really applies to all responders (especially Cat 1 and Cat 2) why isn’t it labelled to reflect this?  The acronym has already been re-purposed once, but I fear that any further tinkering would only be cosmetic.

In cases where the JESIP principles have not been applied it has mostly been the emergency services that have been at fault. Understanding why and how these omissions occur is vital if the current model is to continue.  There are very good arguments for suggesting that we need a more fundamental reform of our structures, culture and concept of operations but that debate has only limited traction at present.

I have been lucky enough to have had a walk on role in quite a few major incidents.  In such circumstances time misbehaves.  In some respects a dreadful slow motion sets in but for the most part hours and minutes vanish in moment.  In short commanders are very busy.  They are under a lot of pressure and can easily be overwhelmed by both the demands placed upon and the situation itself.  It is not surprising that commanders become task focused and that those tasks are centred on the performance of single service functions.  It is not that operational, tactical and strategic commanders don’t recognise the importance of multi agency working, it just doesn’t get to the top of the ‘to do’ list.   The answer to this lies partly in resources.  Control rooms are often criticised but they are staffed according to pre calculated demand curves that have little room for spontaneous disasters and normally place command responsibilities on one or two people.  They are not configured to analyse huge amounts of ambiguous information or to provide support for commanders.  Viewing a command and control log during a major incident is like reading the credits after a film with the playback set on fast forward.  The use of strat ads, tac ads, peer support and ‘’phone a friend’ can all help but few plans are truly sophisticated enough to engage at this level. Major incidents unleash a tidal wave of demand and emotion on individual commanders and organisations, often without warning.  A greater understanding of how this promotes some actions and makes other less likely would be help.  The input of professional psychologists into this discussion is essential.  We probably have a lot to learn from the armed services here.

Very recently I discussed the METHANE mnemonic with a group of 2 year service police officers.  Everybody recognises the value of such linguistic devices, both for learning and in an operational context.  However they made a very good point in that M/ETHANE is only one of dozens of such things that they have to remember or refer to and that many of the others are vital to their day to day, as opposed to their occasional,  working lives.  Some servicers do use M/ETHANE as part of their routine business and this seems to me to be entirely sensible.  Why do we expect people to change the basis of their communication when they are in crisis?  A couple of months ago I had a similar conversation with middle ranking police officers.  They were confident that they would follow the JESIP principles.  I took comfort from this but some were from a police force much criticised in two recent reports for its failure to follow JESIP.    When asked to run through M/ETHANE and the JESIP principles they were more than a little shaky.

Some colleagues would say that this is just a matter of training and briefing.  I disagree and the insight of the above described probationary police officers was helpful.  Some compared their JESIP training with the training they receive in matters such as manual handling and data protection, ie designed to allow the organisation to be able to say that the training has been delivered rather than being designed to truly prepare them for the horrors that their career choice may deliver to them.  As organisations of all sorts rush to meet the recommendations of inquiries such as Manchester and Grenfell there is a danger of tick box approach that will fade with time.  If the lessons really had been learnt from (insert name of any incident 1985-2017) then the response to Manchester would have been different.

I have never been a fan of large scale exercises.  They have a place but they do little to prepare individuals or organisations for unexercised scenarios.  Exercising and training is expensive and government funding inadequate.  Some of the most basic inputs can have the greatest impacts.  Short deliveries to the front line by their operational supervisors (themselves an important target for extended training) and using ‘what if…’ games based on real local incidents might drive JESIP or its replacement into the common imagination.

One of the challenges faced in discussing JESIP is that it is accorded a semi sacred status by some practitioners.  There is now perhaps a need for a little iconoclasm.  We would all wish to hold on to the simplicity and the intent of JESIP but we have to confront the deeper problems of the emergency management world, JESIP is, after all, merely the front end of a bigger system. This includes the legislative base (Civil Contingencies Act 2004 etc) through to single serviced doctrines and training.  We must also explore the very nature of multi agency partnership in crisis.

The idea of working together to resolve or mitigate a major incident is a noble one.  But in our model each agency is sovereign.  Each has its own legislative and constitutional role.  There are no overall commanders. There are often circles to be squared.  The system functions because of the good will of the players rather than as a result of its design.   In looking closely at incidents I sometimes wonder whether the decisions described as ‘joint’ are really a product of consultative debate or are the result of dominant influences.  Is the Joint Decision Model a useful tool or a shield?  The nature of the interactions in multi agency command groups are highly complicated, fascinating and require further research.  It is telling that in the aftermath of incidents the various organisations go their separate ways to prepare for an inquiry where they will be represented by their own lawyers whose duty it is to protect the reputational position of Agency X as opposed to Agency Y.

JESIP was created as a sticking plaster and has provided a focus that has been useful.  It has not solved the problem of agencies working together and cannot assist with the big questions of how we prepare for, and respond to, disasters.  It is time to have a really close look at all of these things.  I look forward to reading Rob Davis’s thesis.

 

Philip Trendall

 

NOTE:  I have been criticised for being something of an ‘armchair general’ when it comes to emergency management.  Such comments are painful because they are largely true. But, a General??  No.  I see myself more as a saloon bar charlatan.  I imagine myself sitting on the studded, but rather faded, seats in the corner of a decent pub, with a pint of Directors (in a jug of course) in one hand and a pipe in the other.  The latter not being connected to the filthy habit of smoking but rather being a device for declamatory accentuation. I address anybody who will listen (rarely the same person twice).   I aspire to be an armchair General