A Post Pandemic Inquiry is Inevitable - But What Should It Look Like?

It’s not over yet. There is a long way to go before we can breathe a sigh of relief.  The battle against Covid-19 is one that will continue to be fought on many fronts for a long while yet.

However, this does not mean that we can’t be doing a lot of looking ahead.  One of the questions that is now bubbling to the surface is what sort of inquiry we should have into have the UK preparedness  for, and response to the pandemic.  The article in the Guardian this weekend (1), the calls for a Fatal Accident Inquiry in Scotland (2) and the points made by Sir Ed Davey (3) (Leader of the Liberal Democrats) at Prime Minister’s Questions this week all represent a growing groundswell that will lead to a public inquiry of some sort. There are some that will dismiss these demands as nothing more than a ‘blame game’.  They are either naïve or politically motivated.  The deaths of tens of thousands of Britons is worth asking a few questions.  The prospect of improving our response in the future is worth a few more.  The heroism of NHS and care staff cannot be allowed to act as a shield to obscure the rights and wrongs of decision and policy makers.  A search for scapegoats would be damaging and counter productive.  A search to identify, at a strategic level, what went well and what didn’t is something different; it is, rather, something that is essential.

A public Inquiry of some sort is inevitable.  The near immediate question is what form should it take?

We are aware of the options:

Debriefs

Non Statutory Reviews and Inquiries

Inquests and Fatal Accident Inquiries

Public inquiry

Royal Commission

The pros and cons of each have been discussed elsewhere.

Roger Gomm has written about debriefs in an insightful blog for the Crisis Response Journal (CRJ).  They will be essential.  It is from local and organisational debriefs that some of the quickest and most useful learning will emerge.  I hope that, in some places at least, they are already planned and ready to go.  Learning at this level is an important part of preparing for the next wave.

As for the for the bigger picture my opinion is worth no more than anybody else’s and a lot less than those of experts in the field.  But I would suggest that success lies in doing several things at once.  What we would wish to avoid is a situation where the government comes under tremendous pressure and decides that a tipping point has been reached.  It sets up an inquiry and thereafter avoids scrutiny by declaring that it would be best if everybody sits back and waits for the results of the inquiry.  This is a political tactic that has played out in several countries many times over the years.  On the same spectrum there is little advantage in having numerous uncoordinated inquiries each with different levels of resourcing and different angles of approach.

One option would be to divide up the tasks.  This is not unheard of.  After the Grenfell Tower fire the ongoing public inquiry was established but at the same time a review into Building Regulations and Fire Safety was commissioned under Dame Judith Hackett.  She reported in May 2018 (4).

A possible model could look like:

1.       No inquests for fatal accident inquiries unless there are individual circumstances that suggest that it is in the public interest to have one.  The Chief Coroner or the Lord Advocate/Solicitor General could be the arbiter with the potential for appeal to the High Court. 

2.       An immediate independent review into the lessons that need to be learned quickly, this could either be based on the independent review undertaken by Lord Kerslake (5) after the Manchester bombing (but on a bigger scale) or could be a non statutory (NSI)/statutory inquiry with very tight terms of reference.  The key point here is speed.  An authoritative statement of lessons is required in order to be ready for the next pandemic.

3.       A full public inquiry into the preparations and response to the pandemic.  This will need to be well resourced and well led.  It will take time.  The terms of reference should allow for the inquiry to examine the positives and to amend or add to the recommendations made by the review.

4.       A NSI/Statutory inquiry along the lines of the Clarke Inquiry into the Identification of the Dead after the Marchioness (6) into the structure of civil protection in the UK, including subjects such as:  The relationship between local planning and central government.  The relationship between these tiers and specialist planning (eg Health, COMAH etc).  Command structures.  The Civil Contingencies Act.  JESIP (much criticised in the Grenfell Phase One Report) (7).  Central government command and control.  The civil protection ‘profession’, including education, training and standards and enforcement of civil protection duties.

The 9/11 Commission Report includes the somewhat chilling paragraph:

                “Emergency response is a produce of preparedness.  On the morning of September 11,                        2001, the last best hope for the community of people working in or visiting the World Trade                  Center rested not with national policymakers but with private firms and local public                            servants, especially the first responders…….”  (Emphasis added). (7)

Like 9/11 there are no questions about the heroism of the front line responders, but in the same sense there is a need to look at how we got to where we are. We must get the inquiry process right.  Getting it right means informed discussion on the part of everybody with a view.  That discussion needs to start now.

Philip Trendall

Philip@scott-trendall.co.uk   

April 2020

(1)    Revealed: UK Ministers Were Warned Last Year. The Guardian, 25 April 2020. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/24/revealed-uk-ministers-were-warned-last-year-of-risks-of-coronavirus-pandemic [accessed 25/04/2020].

(2)    Coronavirus: Call For FAIs For NHS and Care Workers. BBC, 23 April 2020. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-52395279 [accessed 25/04/2020]

(3)    Hansard: House of Commons (2020) Prime Minister’s Questions [Hansard]. 22 April 2020. Available from https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2020-04-22/debates/ECA737FF-6432-42BE-94DE-958E6956C6E7/Engagements#contribution-B4A0B8F1-4124-472A-9523-CD5D9B89075F [accessed 25/04/2020].

(4)    Hackitt, Dame Judith (2018) Building a Safer Future; Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report. Cm9607, London HMSO. Available from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/707785/Building_a_Safer_Future_-_web.pdf [accessed 25/04/2020].

(5)    Kerslake, Lord Robert (2018) An Independent Review into the preparedness for, and emergency response to, the Manchester Arena Attack on 22^nd May 2017.  Manchester. Available from https://www.kerslakearenareview.co.uk/media/1022/kerslake_arena_review_printed_final.pdf [accessed 25/04/2020].

(6)    Clarke, LJ. (2001) Public Inquiry into the Identification of Victims Following Major Transport Accidents: Report of Lord Justice Clarke, volume 1, CM 5012, London: TSO,  9.

(7)    Moor-Bick, Sir Martin. (2020) Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report. Available from https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report [accessed 25/04/2020].

(8)    9/11 Commission (2002). Heroism and Horror. 278.  Available from https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf [accessed 25/04/2020].

Scott Trendall Ltd is a small civil protection consultancy and training provider.  The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and should not be taken as the view of any client of Scott Trendall Ltd.